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INTRODUCTION

Just over ten years ago, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) 1 decided that Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 2 had become dated and needed
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. The author
thanks Dean Michael Young and the law school for their generous research support.
Professor Peter B. Maggs gave me many helpful suggestions.
I NCCUSL is a non-profit organization organized in 1892 for the purpose of
drafting model state laws and persuading state legislatures to enact them. Its membership includes over 300 lawyers,judges, and law professors. It has had great success
in its many endeavors. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, About

Us, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/aboutus.asp (last updated June 18, 2002).
2

U.C.C. art. 2 (2002).
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a complete revision to meet the demands of modern commerce. 3
This determination had potentially momentous consequences. Arti-

cle 2 is a model law, drafted in the 1950s and enacted in forty-nine
states and various territories and possessions. 4 Because Article 2 governs almost all contracts for the sale of goods, 5 its revision could affect

the legal rules applicable to consumer and non-consumer transactions
worth trillions of dollars each year. 6
Since the time of NCCUSL's decision to modernize Article 2, two
successive drafting committees have worked ardently on the revision
project. 7 Their labors have produced more than a dozen detailed
drafts.8 The initial drafts sought to update nearly all aspects of Article
2. 9 This approach, however, proved too controversial. NCCUSL was
worried that some state legislatures might refuse to enact the contemplated changes because of potential opposition from consumer or
business groups.1 0 NCCUSL did not want to destroy the present uniformity of Article 2 by advancing amendments that some jurisdictions
might reject."
Accordingly, several years ago, NCCUSL began scaling back its
plans for revision.' 2 At long last, on August 5, 2002, it announced its
3
final approval of a rather modest set of amendments to Article 2.1
3 See Richard E. Speidel, Introduction to Symposium on Proposed Revised Article 2, 54
SMU L. REV. 787, 789 & n.12 (2001) (describing the decision to revise Article 2 and
the appointment of a drafting committee).
4 See UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, Table of Jurisdictions Wherein Code Has Been
Adopted, 1B U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 2002).
5 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (defining the scope of Article 2).
6 Statistics on retail and merchant wholesale sales are available from the U.S.
Census Bureau. See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last updated Nov.
11, 2002).
7 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 790-91.
8 For the full text of these drafts, see Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif.
State Laws, Drafts of Uniform and Model Acts, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ulc_frame.htm (last updated Sept. 14, 2002).
9 The 1999 Annual Meeting Draft, for example, sought to rewrite large portions
of Article 2. See id.
10 See Linda J. Rusch, A History and Perspective of Revised Article 2: The Never Ending
Saga of a Search for Balance, 52 SMU L. REV. 1683, 1684 (1999).
11 See id.
12 See Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, NCCUSL Accepts Compromise on Scope but Rejects Bid 7o
FinalizeArt. 2 Changes, 70 U.S.L.W. 2099, 2099-100 (Aug. 21, 2001) (describing how
the drafting committee has scaled back its ambition for revising Article 2) [hereinafter NCCUSL Accepts Compromise].
13 For the press release announcing NCCUSL's decision, see Nat'l Conference of
Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Revision to Key Articles of the Uniform Commercial
Code Completed, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/pressreleases/prO8O5O2-UCC.
asp (Aug. 5, 2002). For the actual text of the approved amendments, see Proposed
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The proposed revisions facilitate electronic commercial transactions
and make minor corrections and adjustments but otherwise avoid sig14
nificant substantive changes.
The approved amendments will not become law until they overcome two hurdles. First, the American Law Institute (ALI) 15, with
whom NCCUSL traditionally has collaborated when drafting and revising the U.C.C., must approve the changes. This approval is highly
likely but not certain because NCCUSL and the ALI have disagreed
16
about Article 2 in the past.
Second, and more significantly, state legislatures must enact the
amendments. NCCUSL has an impressive record of persuading states
to pass its model laws, but it may have some difficulty persuading legislators of the need to make the proposed revisions, scaled back as they
are. Even if all goes well, the process will take years to complete.
The decision not to revise Article 2 from top to bottom as originally planned raises an important question: how significant is
NCCUSL's failure to achieve what it set out to accomplish when it
decided to undertake a complete modernization of Article 2 in 1991?
In other words, will the commercial law suffer a great deal, or is the
scaling back of the project not so very important?
Assessing the need to revise Article 2 is very difficult, if not impossible. Commentators and participants in the revision process have
had widely different opinions. 17 This Article, accordingly, does not
Amendments to Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales (2002), at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/annual2OO2.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Annual Meeting 2002 Draft].

14 Commentators generally agreed that more ambitious changes had little likelihood of passing. See Fred H. Miller & William H. Henning, The State of the Uniform
Commercial Code-2001, SG043 ALI-ABA 1, 8-9 (2001) (discussing Article 2's uncer-

tain future, and concluding, "While a number of fixes in amended Article 2 would be
nice, an amendment effort that goes too far to cover minor matters or takes too regulatory a stance will fail").
15 The ALI is a private organization of lawyers, judges, and law professors.
Founded in 1923, the ALI has devoted its energy to improving the law by publishing
restatements of the law and working with NCCUSL on model laws. See American Law
Institute, About the American Law Institute, at http://www.ali.org (last visited Sept.

23, 2002).
16 In 2001, the ALI approved a set of revisions, but NCCUSL withheld its approval. See NCCUSL Accepts Compromise, supra note 12, at 2099-100.
17 The decade-long work of the ALI and NCCUSL's drafting committees demon-

strate the continuing support of these organizations for the idea of revising Article 2,
although they have not always agreed on every detail. Prominent industry opposition
came from General Electric and the Software Publishers Association. See Michael Rustad & Lori E. Eisenschmidt, The Commercial Law of Internet Security, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J.
213, 274 n.301 (1995). ProfessorJamesJ. White led much of the academic opposition
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argue either for or against revision. Instead, it has a more limited
goal. It strives to demonstrate only that events of the past decade have
made changing the law increasingly less important. In other words, it
seeks to show that, however urgent the need to modernize Article 2
was in 1990, this need ironically has waned with the passage of time.
Article 2 requires less change now than it did a decade ago to meet
the requirements of modern commerce.
This Article supports this claim by looking at three very significant developments that have occurred since 1990. The first is the
emergence of "electronic commerce"-the buying and selling of
goods in transactions formed using computers. 8 The widespread introduction of a new way of creating contracts for the sale of goods, at
first blush, might seem to increase the need for revising Article 2. Yet,
as explained more fully below, 1 the recent growth of electronic commerce actually tends to diminish the importance of Article 2's present
contract formation rules because it removes many sales transactions
from the coverage of those rules. Moreover, although electronic commerce raises new legal issues, the states and federal government al20
ready have enacted separate legislation to deal with them.
The second development relates to an important decision that
NCCUSL made regarding the scope of Article 2. In particular, when
NCCUSL began the revision process, it wanted to make Article 2 govern all aspects of contracts for the sale of computer software. 2' During the past ten years, however, NCCUSL has changed its mind. It
to Article 2. See Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A View from the Trenches, 52
HAsTrINGs L.J. 607, 617 n.32 (2001) (asserting that Professor White "opposed much of

Revised Article 2 in print, on the floor of the ALl and NCCUSL, and in strategy sessions with strong sellers outside of the process"). For examples of criticism, see Patricia A. Tauchert, A Survey of Part 5 of Revised Article 2, 54 SMU L. REV. 971, 972 (2001)
(noting that the strongest concerns include the application of Article 2 to software,
the relationship to the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, federal legislation on
electronic contracting, and warranty rights); James J. White, Form Contracts Under Revised Article 2, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 315, 322-26 (1997) (criticizing proposed revision
requiring sellers to disclose all terms and obtain informed consent on form contracts); and JamesJ. White, Comments at 1997 AALS Annual Meeting: ConsumerProtection
and the Uniform Commercial Code, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 219 (1997) (arguing against consumer protection provisions).
18 For general information on electronic commerce, see DAVID BAUMER &J.C.
POINDEXTER, CYBERLAW AND E-COMMERCE

(2002);

SUSAN SINGLETON,

ECOMMERCE:

A

(2001); BARRY B. SOOKMAN, COMPUTER, INTERNET AND
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE LAW (1991 & Supp. 2000); and BENJAMIN WRIGHT &JANE K.
WINN, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (3d ed. 2000).
19 See infra Part II.
20 See infia Part 1I.
21 See infra text accompanying notes 156-57.
PRACrICAL GUIDE TO THE LAW
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now has chosen to deal with the sale of computer information
through a separate body of law, the Uniform Computer Information
Transaction Act (UCITA).22 Although UCITA has obtained only minimal legislative approval and remains highly controversial, 23 the decision to treat the subject of computer software sales outside of Article 2
lessens the importance of revising Article 2 for reasons explained
below.
The third development is that a decade of precedent has accumulated since NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2 in 1991. The numerous new cases have significance because NCCUSL wanted to revise
Article 2 in large part to resolve unsettled issues that had arisen under
its current text.2 4 The numerous decisions interpreting Article 2 dur-

ing the past decade have gone a long way in settling many of these
questions. Article 2, accordingly, has become more certain and less in
need of revision with the passage of time.
The remainder of this Article consists of five parts. Part I describes Article 2 and the lengthy attempt to revise it. Parts II, III, and
IV then address the three developments that have lessened the need
for rewriting Article 2. A brief conclusion follows.

I.

ARTICLE

A.

2

AND THE REViSION PROCESS

Creation of the Original Article 2

The common law governed contracts for the sale of goods for
most of this nation's history. 25 In 1906, however, this tradition began
to end. In that year, NCCUSL promulgated the "Uniform Sales

27
Act," 26 a model state law seeking to codify important sales rules.

Drafted by Professor Samuel Williston, the Uniform Sales Act quickly
received widespread approval. 28 Eventually, the legislatures of more
29
than two-thirds of the states enacted it.

In the 1940s, inspired by the success of the Uniform Sales Act and
other uniform state laws, NCCUSL and the ALI decided to create
22
23
24
25
102:3
26
27
28
29

See UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 11 (Supp. 2002).
See infra Part III.
See infra Part III.
See 1 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES
(1998) (describing common law history).
See UNIF. SALES AcT, 1 U.L.A. 1 (1950).
See I HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 25, § 1-103:3 n.1.
See id.
See id.

§

1-
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what eventually became the U.C.C.30 The U.C.C. is a massive model

law that governs a variety of commercial topics, including sales. As
part of the U.C.C. drafting project, NCCUSL and the ALI chose to
replace the Uniform Sales Act with what is now Article 2. NCCUSL
and the ALI published the first official draft of U.C.C. Article 2 in
1951.- 1 The last set of major amendments to Article 2 took place in
1958.32

Article 2 has breathtaking scope. The article governs transactions
in "goods,"33 which it defines to include all things which are movable
plus several other types of things. 3 4 It covers contracts made by both
merchants and non-merchants, although it contains some special
rules applicable only to merchants.3 5 Every year, Article 2 governs innumerable sales, ranging from small transactions at vending machines
and grocery stores to sales of extraordinarily expensive equipment like
aircraft and supercomputers.
B.

The Ongoing Effort To Revise Article 2

Academic writers began questioning whether the ALI and
NCCUSL should modernize Article 2 in the mid-1980s. 36 In 1986,
their scholarship came to the attention of Professor Geoffrey Hazard,
who was serving as the chair of the Uniform Commercial Code's Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) 3 7 and the Director of the ALl. 3 In
these capacities, Professor Hazard asked Professors Charles Mooney
and Richard Speidel to prepare a memorandum on whether Article 2
39
of the U.C.C. required revision.
30

SeeJAMESJ. WI-IrTE &.ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1, at 3

(3d ed. 1988) (describing U.C.C. history).
31 See id.at 4.
32 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 788.
33 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002).
34 Id. §§ 2-105, 107.
35 See id. § 2-104(1) (defining the term merchant); id. § 2-104 cmt. 2 (discussing
the fourteen merchant rules in Article 2).
36 See, e.g., Fairfax Leary, Jr. & David Frisch, Is Revision Duefor Article 2?, 31 VILL. L.
REV. 399 (1986).

37 The Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. is a committee with twelve members. It monitors the U.C.C., seeking to discourage non-uniform amendments or interpretations and to detect needs for modernization. See Peter Winship, Law Making
and Article 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 41 ALA. L. REV. 673, 677 n.17 (1990)
(describing the composition of the PEB and its functions in 1986).
38 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 788-89.
39 See id.
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Professors Speidel and Mooney completed this memorandum in
1987, expressing the view that Article 2 needed various changes. 40 In
response to their memorandum, the PEB appointed a Study Group to
consider the matter further, and named Professor Speidel to chair this
Study Group. 41 In the fall of 1990, the PEB Study Group prepared a
"preliminary report" on the subject. 42

Then, in the spring of 1991,

the Study Group completed a more focused report, which it called an
"executive summary." 4 3 These documents, discussed more fully below, expressed the view that Article 2 needed revision.
In the fall of 1991, based on the recommendation of the PEB
Study Group, NCCUSL appointed a drafting committee to prepare a
proposed revision. 44 It selected Professor Speidel to serve as the Chief
Reporter. 4 5 Later, it appointed Professor Linda Rusch to serve as the
Associate Reporter. 46 The Article 2 drafting committee produced its
first draft of the revised article in 1994 and then produced subsequent
47
drafts every year through 1999.

The committee's July 1995 draft marked a turning point in the
revision project. In that draft, the committee made an important
choice when deciding how to address contracts for computer software.
In particular, the drafters proposed to turn Article 2 into a general
"hub" that would contain provisions important for both the sale of
goods and the licensing of software, and then to create an Article 2B
as a "spoke" that would contain special provisions for computer
software.

48

The "hub and spoke" experiment lasted only about a year. In
1996, the committee produced a revised draft that abandoned the approach.49 It made this decision because NCCUSL chose to handle
licensing of computer information in a separate uniform law that
40 See id. at 789.
41 See id.
42 See ABA Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report of the
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 986-98 (1991).
43 See PEB Study Group, Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive Summary, 46
Bus. LAw. 1869 (1991).
44 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 789.
45 See id.
46 See Rusch, supra note 10, at 1683 n.*.
47 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 789-90.
48 Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code
Article 2B: Dec. 12, 1996 Draft, at 7, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucc2/uccartl.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
49 See id.
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eventually became known as the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA).5°
In May 1999, the ALI approved a proposed final draft. 51 At the
ALI meeting, the Executive Director and President of NCCUSL supported the proposal. 52 NCCUSL, however, later decided not to vote
on the draft because it feared that the draft would not win support of
all the state legislatures.5 At this point, Professors Speidel and Rusch
54
resigned from the drafting committee in protest.
NCCUSL then appointed a new drafting committee. The current
reporter is Professor Henry Deeb Gabriel.5 5 This new committee
worked on the project with diligence and obtained NCCUSL's final
approval for a draft in August 2002. As noted above, this draft greatly
has scaled back the drafting goals.5 6 Instead of completely revising
57
Article 2, the committee has sought only to amend a few provisions.
It has decided to add provisions on electronic commerce and rewrite
a few troublesome provisions, while leaving most of the article
58
intact.
As of the time of this writing, the future of even these less ambitious changes remains in doubt. The ALI must approve them, and no
one knows for sure how state legislatures will react. It is likely, however, that they will become law in the next few years.
C.

The Difficulties of Revision

Professor Speidel has offered a convincing explanation for why
the NCCUSL and ALI have taken so long in approving a final revision
of Article 2. 59 He does not lay the blame at the feet of any one person
or organization. Instead, he identifies five factors that each have
made changing the current law difficult.
50 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 790 n.13.
51 See Revised U. C. C. Sales Provisions Considered,Electronic Commcerce Issues Still Troubling, 68 U.S.L.W. 2714, 2714 (May 30, 2000) (describing the final draft history).
52 See Speidel, supra note 17, at 611 & n.15.
53 See id. at 611 & n.17.

54 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 790.
55 See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, NCCUSL Committees/
Members, at http://www.nccusl.org (last updated June 18, 2002). Professor Gabriel
served as a member of the original drafting committee. See Speidel, supra note 17, at

612 n.18.
56

See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13.

57 See id.
58 See id.
59

See Speidel, supra note 3, at 791-93.
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First, Professor Speidel points out that, from the outset, no important group of commercial buyers or sellers was demanding a revision of Article 2.60 Most businesses felt content with the status quo
and viewed every proposed change with skepticism. 6 1 The drafters
thus faced an uphill battle from the start.
Second, Professor Speidel believes the effort to draft a "hub and
spoke" version of Article 2 had lingering negative effects even after its
abandonment. 62 When the drafters attempted to turn Article 2 into
the "hub," they renumbered and rewrote many of its provisions.6 3
The 1999 draft continued to reflect many of these changes, giving Ar64
ticle 2 an unfamiliar visage that troubled opponents of the revision.
Third, Professor Speidel observes that removing the subject of
computer information licenses from the scope of the revision did not
eliminate controversy about them. 65 Although NCCUSL decided to
deal with licenses in UCITA, questions about the interaction between
UCITA and Article 2 remain. 66 Any proposed revision of Article 2
must address these changes.
Fourth, Professor Speidel notes that the Article 2 drafting committee ran into great difficulty in addressing consumer protection issues. 6 7 In his view, the committee never could provide sufficient
measures to satisfy the desires of consumer groups. 68 Yet, at the same
time, commercial interests found excessive even the limited consumer
69
protection provisions under consideration.
Fifth, Professor Speidel explains that the entire process became
very political. 70 Commercial interests persuaded NCCUSL that they
would lobby state legislatures against adopting the revision if they did
not get what they wanted. 7 1 NCCUSL took these warnings seriously
because it did not want to propose legislation that would not enjoy
60 See id. at 791.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 791-92.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 792.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See id. On the merits, Professor Speidel strongly disputes the claim that the
drafting committee exalted the rights of consumers over the rights of sellers. See Speidel, supra note 17, at 614-16.
70 See Speidel, supra note 3, at 792.
71 See id.
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universal adoption. 72 The ALI, however, felt more reluctant to
73
change its views based on commercial interests.
Professor Speidel's analysis is persuasive. In fact, to bolster his
position, he might have compared the Article 2 revision process to the
recent drafting efforts that produced Article 4A on funds transfers
and revised Article 5 on letters of credit. The ALI and NCCUSL had
little difficulty approving these revisions, and they sailed through the
74
state legislatures.
The committees working on Articles 4A and 5 did not face any of
the factors that Professor Speidel believes impeded the revision of Article 2. Commercial interests strongly favored the creation of Article
4A because no legislation comprehensively addressed funds transfers, 7 5 and they favored revising Article 5 because it did not reflect the
realities of modern letter of credit usage. 7 6 Consumer groups, moreover, did not oppose these articles because funds transfers and letters
of credit have little impact on consumers. In addition, neither Article
4A nor Article 5 suffered from the difficulties similar to those that
arose from the aborted "hub and spoke" draft revision of Article 2.
In any event, the effort to revise Article 2 has not yet achieved
success. As noted above, the final draft approved in August 2002 did
not include very many significant changes. The question therefore
remains whether the need to revise Article 2 has increased or decreased during the past ten years. If the need has grown, then the
failure of the revision process to accomplish more of NCCUSL's original goals is more serious than if the need has diminished.

72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts: UCC Article 4A, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca4a.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) (showing widespread
adoption of these recently revised articles); Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif.
State Laws, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts: UCC Article 5, at http://
www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucca5.asp
(last visited
Nov. 6, 2002) (same).
75 See U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1994) (explaining that Article 4A was needed

because there was "no comprehensive body of law that defines the rights and obligations that arise from wire transfers").
76 See id. art. 5 prefatory note (explaining how "the customs and practices for
letter of credit" have changed in the past fifty years, requiring a revision of Article 5).
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THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

Article 2 contains a number of rules regarding the formation of
contracts for the sale of goods. 7 7 Accordingly, in deciding whether
the need to revise Article 2 has increased or decreased during the past
decade, one important question is whether the methods of forming
contracts to buy and sell goods have changed. The answer to this
question is decidedly yes. In fact, of all the changes that have occurred in sales of goods in the past ten years, the methods of forming
sales contracts have seen the most innovation.
Although people still mostly use traditional methods to buy and
sell goods, a significant amount of electronic commerce has emerged.
The term "electronic commerce" refers to contracts made by means of
computers or other electronic devices. 78 It typically includes transactions conducted over the Internet, either at vendors' websites or
through email.
At first blush, the growth of electronic commerce might seem to
necessitate substantial changes to Article 2. After all, Article 2 came
into being in the 1950s before anyone contemplated electronic transactions. Article 2, therefore, unsurprisingly contains no provisions
specifically designed to deal with them.
The reality, however, differs for two reasons. First, because the
provisions in Article 2 concerning the formation of contracts have little to say about electronic commerce, the growth of electronic commerce has made them less important. Second, to the extent that
electronic commerce raises new legal issues, legislation outside of the
U.C.C. already has addressed most of them. The following discussion
elaborates these points.
A.

How Parts of Article 2 Are Becoming Less Relevant

To observe how electronic commerce is making parts of Article 2
less relevant, consider the following example. Suppose that a law
school is running short on supplies. It wants to purchase a hundred
boxes of pens, markers, and chalk. It knows an office supply company
that might have these items. Consider how the law school would go
about purchasing the items.
77

See id. §§ 2-201 to -210 (2002) (stating rules concerning the "Form, Formation

and Readjustment of Contract").
78 The term "electronic commerce" (or sometimes "e-commerce") refers to
"transactions conducted over the Internet, either by consumers purchasing goods and
services, or directly between businesses." MICROSOFT ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DIC-

at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/Dictionary/DictionaryHome.
asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
TIONARY,
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In 1960, 1970, or 1980, if a buyer like the law school wanted to
purchase a bulk order of goods, it might call a seller on the telephone. The seller might provide a price quote, a description of the
goods, and a statement of the terms on which the seller wished to sell
them. The buyer then would fill out one of the buyer's purchase order forms and mail it to the seller. The seller would send back an
acknowledgment and, at the same time or a little while later, would
ship the goods.
This routine once pervaded the economy. You can imagine the
law school and the office supply company taking these actions, not
just once, but hundreds of times over the past decades. Similarly,
many thousands of other businesses and institutions were buying and
selling goods in this manner every day.
In 1990, the transaction probably would follow the same pattern,
with one possible change resulting from a technological advance that
became ubiquitous in the 1980s. In particular, the law school probably would fax its purchase order to the office supply company rather
than mail it. The office supply company might then return a confirmation by fax, as well. Very little else would change. The terms of the
forms exchanged probably would remain the same.
When the ALI and NCCUSL were drafting the U.C.C. in the late
1940s and early 1950s, they recognized that this simple but seemingly
timeless type of transaction occurred thousands of times a day. They
also realized that it could be important to determine whether parties
had created a contract and, if they did, what the terms of the contract
might be. Accordingly, they included in part 2 of Article 2 a number
of very detailed rules to address issues that might arise when contracts
79
for the sale of goods are formed in this manner.
Section 2-206(1) (b), for instance, makes clear that a buyer's
purchase order will be construed as an offer to buy goods, unless it
says otherwise. 80 This rule saves parties (and later the courts) the
79 See U.C.C. §§ 2-201 to -210 (stating rules concerning the "Form, Formation and
Readjustment of Contract").
80 See id. § 2-206(1)(b). The U.C.C. states,
Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or circumstances .

.

. an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current

shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current shipment of conforming or nonconforming goods, but such a shipment of non-conforming goods does not
constitute an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer that the

shipment is offered only as an accommodation to the buyer.
Id.; see also Harper Trucks, Inc. v. Allied Welding Supply, Inc., 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(CBC) 835 (D. Kan. 1986).

20031

WANING IMPORTANCE

OF REVISIONS TO U.C.C.

ARTICLE

2

607

trouble of scrutinizing the possibly ambiguous or pithy language of a
purchase order to determine whether it constitutes an offer or merely
preliminary negotiations. 8 1 The seller knows that it can accept the
purchase order and form a contract.
Section 2-206(1) (b) not only specifies that purchase orders are
offers, but also indicates two ways that the seller may accept them.
One way the seller can accept is simply to ship the goods.8 2 Indeed, as
an example of their foresight, the drafters of the U.C.C. even thought
to say in section 2-206(1) (b) that a shipment of non-conforming
goods would constitute an acceptance. 83 That way, if the goods
turned out to be defective, the seller could not escape liability by
84
claiming not to have accepted the contract.
Another way to accept is for the seller to promise to ship the
goods, such as by sending or faxing back a confirmation.8 5 If the
seller chooses this method, however, another issue may arise. If the
buyer drafted its purchase form, and the seller drafted its confirmation, the two may contain discrepancies in their terms. A question
may arise whether the differences in the forms prevent formation of a
contract.
Under the common law mirror-image rule, a purported acceptance that differs from the offer in any way constitutes an implied re-

81 See I WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2206:2 (2002). The common law of contracts generally requires courts to determine
whether the offeror "manifest[ed] ...a willingness to enter into a bargain, so made as
to justify another person in understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited
and will conclude it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 (1981). Outside of
the law of sales, this process often is ambiguous. See, e.g.,
Owen v. Tunison, 158 A. 926
(Me. 1932) (holding that the defendant's letter was a general invitation to negotiate
and not an offer to sell property).
82 See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
83 See id.
84 Professor Hawkland explains,
Under the pre-Code law, if the offeror, usually the buyer, specified shipment
of goods as the mode of acceptance, he would have no remedy if nonconforming goods were shipped by the offeree (seller), because the offeree
could argue either (a) that the goods shipped did conform to the contract
and therefore did not breach it, or (b) that the goods did not conform to
the contract, and therefore their shipment did not constitute an acceptance,
because acceptance of an offer to enter into a unilateral contract is accomplished only if the offeree does the act requested by the offeror (here, by
shipment of conforming goods).
1 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 81, § 2-206:3.
85 See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
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jection and a counter-offer.8 6 This rule ensures that parties are not
bound to terms to which they do not assent. But the mirror-image
rule also has drawbacks. If the parties do not pay careful attention to
the forms, they may think that they have a contract, only to discover
later that minor differences have prevented the contract's formation.8 7 Either party then can back out of the transaction without liability for breach, despite potential harm to the other party.88
The drafters of the U.C.C. sought to address this problem by creating exceptions to the mirror-image rule. Under section 2-207(1),89
a contract may be formed even if the purported acceptance contains
additional or different terms, unless the acceptance specifically requires the offeror to assent to these terms. 90 If the parties formed a
contract despite differences between the offer and acceptance, section
2-207(2) specifies the legal effect of any additional terms contained in
a purported acceptance.9 1
86 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 59 ("A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or
different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer.").
87 Note, Offeree's Response Materially Altering an Offer Solely to Offeror's DisadvantageIs
an Acceptance Conditional on Offeror's Assent to the Additional Terms Under Section 2-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 132, 133 (1962).
88 See id.
89 See U.C.C. § 2-207(1). The U.C.C. states,
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
Id. The U.C.C. further states,
Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular
contract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree,
together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
Id. § 2-207(3).
90 See id. § 2-207(l).
91 See id. § 2-207(2).
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless: (a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (b)
they materially alter it; or (c) notification of objection to them has already
been given or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them is
received.
Id. For discussion of the problem of different terms, see infra notes 197-200 and
accompanying text.

20031

WANING

IMPORTANCE

OF

REVISIONS

TO

U.C.C.

ARTICLE

2

609

Even if the exception in section 2-207(1) does not apply, formation may occur under the first sentence of section 2-207(3) as a result
of conduct recognizing the existence of a contract. 92 For example,
the seller could ship the goods and the buyer could accept and pay for
them, notwithstanding a statement in the acceptance requiring the
offeror to accept additional terms.9 3 In this case, the second sentence
of section 2-207(3) would specify that the terms of a contract include
94
any terms upon which the two forms agree.
A contract formed, either by the forms exchanged or by conduct,
might raise another issue that the drafters of the U.C.C. carefully addressed. In particular, the contract might leave unstated important
issues like the time of delivery or the price of the goods. This possibility is especially likely if the contract was formed by conduct under
section 2-703(3) where the forms did not agree. The absence of clear
terms on these topics could present a problem at common law be95
cause the contract might not be sufficiently definite to enforce.
Yet again, the drafters of the U.C.C. had the foresight to address
this difficulty. Section 2-204(3) adopts a more permissive standard
than the common law traditionally did with respect to indefiniteness. 9 6 The section says that a contract does not fail for indefiniteness
so long as the evidence shows that the parties had an agreement and a
97
reasonably certain basis exists for granting an appropriate remedy.
The analysis of this kind of typical transaction under Article 2,
however, would not necessarily end at this point. On the contrary,
questions about the terms of the agreement also might arise because
of the buyer and seller's telephone conversation prior to the shipment. The law school or office supply store might allege that they had
92 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) ("Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence
of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the
parties do not otherwise establish a contract.").
93 See, e.g., Luria Bros. & Co. v. Pielet Bros. Scrap Iron & Metal, Inc., 600 F.2d 103
(7th Cir. 1979).
94 See U.C.C. § 2-207(3) ("In such case the terms of the particular contract consist
of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act."); Dresser Indus.
v. Gradall Co., 965 F.2d 1442 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying this provision).
95 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (1981) ("Even though a
manifestation of intention is intended to be understood as an offer, it cannot be accepted so as to form a contract unless the terms of the contract are reasonably
certain.").
96 See U.C.C. § 2-204(3) ("Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended to make a
contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy.").
97 See id.
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formed an oral agreement regarding the terms of the contract, and
that for some reason the purchase order and the confirmation do not
reflect this oral agreement. The drafters of the U.C.C. included the
parol evidence rule in section 2-202 to specify the extent to which the
contract might include the unwritten terms. 98
Finally, the promises to buy and sell the goods would be enforceable only if the parties satisfied the requirements of the statute of
frauds in section 2-201(1).99 This provision generally requires
promises to buy or sell goods for a price of $500 or more to be evidenced by a signed writing. 0 1 The section, however, contains several
exceptions.10 1 For example, the receipt of the goods or the payment
could satisfy it. 102
This illustration shows something significant about the importance of the formation provisions in Article 2. From the 19 60s to the
1990s, all of the different sections discussed were needed to provide
definite answers to basic questions about whether a typical business
transaction formed a contract and what the terms of the contract
might be. The existence of Article 2's formation provisions during
these decades would seem an absolute necessity.
But now move ahead to the present. Law schools and other businesses still purchase goods, but there is a new way of doing it. Instead
98

See U.C.C. § 2-202. That section provides,
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties

agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as
a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement

or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section 2-208); and (b) by evidence of consistent
additional terms unless the court finds the writing to have been intended

also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
Id.
99

See id. § 2-201(1).
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods

for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense
unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has
been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker.
Id.
100 See id.
101 See id. §§ 2-201 (2)-(3) (stating exceptions to the statute of frauds).
102 See id. § 2-201(3)(c) ("A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of
subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable . . . (c) with respect
to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted (Sec. 2-606).").

2003]

WANING

IMPORTANCE

OF REVISIONS

TO

U.C.C.

ARTICLE

2

611

of buying supplies with a written purchase order, the law school more
likely than not would use a computer to gain access to the Internet
website of its office supply company. The two leading office supply
store chains in the United States, Staples and Office Depot, offer all of
their products online and encourage corporate customers to purchase
1

in this manner.

0

3

The website would provide a complete description of the goods.
The law school user simply would click on the items sought, receive an
immediate confirmation (perhaps both on the screen and by email),
and the seller would ship the goods shortly afterward. This process
has become quite common. Despite the economic downturn and the
failure of many Internet companies, aggregate Internet sales continue
to grow.10 4 At the busiest times of the year, total online sales may
a0 5
reach $220 million in a single day.
What do Article 2's formation provisions say about the formation
of contracts for the sale of goods over the Internet? The reality is not
very much at all. As described above, the formation provisions in Article 2 were designed to handle contracts formed in the traditional
manner of exchanging phone calls and written purchase orders and
confirmations. For the most part, these specialized rules have no application in the context of electronic commerce.
Consider, for instance, each of the provisions described at length
above. Section 2-206(1) (b), on the characterization of purchase orders as offers, 10 6 does not apply to the typical online sale. No need
arises to characterize a purchase order sent by the buyer as an offer
because an Internet buyer does not send a purchase order. Instead,
the buyer indicates assent to a sale merely by clicking on a button on
the seller's website. Likewise, because the buyer does not send a
purchase order, the Internet seller does not accept a purchase order.
Accordingly, section 2-206(1) (b)'s rules on what constitutes a proper
acceptance of the purchase order' 0 7 are similarly irrelevant.
In a typical online transaction, no battle of conflicting forms occurs. Again, the Internet buyer does not send a form to the seller, but
instead merely clicks a website button. Accordingly, section 2-207(1)
and (3) on the formation of contracts involving different forms have
103 See Staples, at http://www.staples.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2002); Office Depot, at http://www.officedepot.com (last visited Oct. 17, 2002).
104 Statistics on retail e-commerce sales are available from the U.S. Census Bureau.
See U.S. Census Bureau, at http://www.census.gov (last updated Nov. 22, 2002).
105

See Online Shoppers Spent $220 Million Monday in Holiday Sales Spike, WALL ST. J.,

Nov. 28, 2001, atJl.
106 See U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(b).
107 See id.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL.

78:2

no relevance. 0 8 Morever, because these provisions do not apply, section 2-207(2) and section 2-20 7 (3)'s second sentence, which concern
the terms that such a contract might have, also do not apply.'0 ,
In most situations the requirement of definiteness also would not
come into question. As noted above, indefiniteness most often becomes a problem when parties form contracts by conduct when their
forms do not agree."I 0 In online transactions, the parties do not exchange conflicting forms, and therefore do not create contracts by
their conduct. Little doubt arises over the terms of their agreement
because the seller's website typically spells them out. For this reason,
section 2-204(3)'s relaxing of the requirement of definiteness has little consequence for online sales.II"
The parol evidence rule in section 2-202 also has no application
to typical Internet transactions. The law school would not call or otherwise communicate with the office supply company to gather information about the sale. Instead, the law school would browse the
seller's website, learn the details, and then just click a box indicating a
desire to purchase the goods. The parties, accordingly, would not
reach any prior understandings or agreements that the parol evidence
rule might affect.
In fact, if a court had to answer the question of whether the law
school and the supplier had a contract, it would need to look at only
one provision of the U.C.C., namely, section 2-204(1).112 This section
says a "contract for sale of goods may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement."" I3 This really is not saying much; as one of
the leading U.C.C. commentators has remarked, "The rule is a fairly
obvious one, because there has never been any doubt that contracts of
sale can be made in a manner other than a writing."' 14 The terms of
the contract formed over the Internet would be those stated in the
website because the buyer does not indicate anything to the contrary.
This simple example illustrates how the development of electronic commerce in many ways makes Article 2 less relevant. A large
number of highly specialized Article 2 provisions that have governed
innumerable sales for over four decades do not apply to sales made
using the new method. Accordingly, to the extent that electronic
commerce replaces ordinary commerce, the provisions of Article 2 are
108
109

See id. §§ 2-207(1), (3).
See id.§§ 2-207(2)-(3).

110

See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.

111
112
113
114

See U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
See id. § 2-204(1).
Id.
1 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 81, § 2-204:1.
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becoming less relevant. The need for revising them thus diminishes
because they affect a decreasing amount of commerce.
B.

New Issues Raised by Electronic Commerce

Even if electronic commerce has made existing Article 2 rules less
important, a separate question is whether electronic commerce raises
any new legal issues that Article 2 must address. The answer to this
question, as the following discussion will show, is no. Although electronic commerce does give rise to several very important new issues,
new federal and state statutes already handle these issues
satisfactorily.

115

1. Statute of Frauds
Section 2-201(1) says that contracts for the sale of goods for a
price of $500 or more generally must be evidenced by a signed writing
to be enforceable. 116 Electronic commerce raises two important questions about this very important Article 2 provision. First, if a buyer
and seller enter a contract by making electronic communications over
the Internet, do their electronic communications constitute a "writing" within the meaning of section 2-201(1)? Second, even if their
communication qualifies as a writing, how can the parties sign this
writing?
Article 2 at present does not answer either of these questions.
Two statutes outside the U.C.C., however, already address them: the
Uniform Electronic Transaction Act of 1999 (UETA), a model state
law enacted in forty-one states,' 1 7 and the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act of 2000 (ESIGN). l" s
Both statutes create exceptions to statutes of frauds so that they do not
prevent enforcement of electronically formed contracts.' 19
115 See Miller & Henning, supra note 14, at 8 (observing that these laws have reduced the urgency of revising Article 2).
116 See U.C.C. § 2-201(1).
117 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws drafted
and published UETA. For information and state adoption statistics, see Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the Uniform Electronic
Transaction Act, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniform
acts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). The full text of UETA is available at http:/

/www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm

(last visited Nov. 6, 2002).

118

15 U.S.C. §§ 7000-7013 (2000).

119

Only one reported case has addressed either UETA or ESIGN as of November

25, 2002. See Specht v. Netscape Communs. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 26 n.11 (2d Cir.
2002).
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UETA, the state legislation, eliminates obstacles to electronic
commerce that section 2-201 (1) (and other statutes of frauds) might
impose by establishing the following four rules:
(a) A record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form.
(b) A contract may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
solely because an electronic record was used in its formation.
(c) If a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record
satisfies the law.
(d) If a law requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the
law. 12o

Pursuant to these principles, electronic records and signatures
may take the place of traditional paper and ink under section 212 1

201(1).

ESIGN, the federal legislation, accomplishes the same result.
ESIGN says that, notwithstanding any previously existing statute of
frauds, "a signature, contract, or other record relating to such transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely
because it is in electronic form." 122 It thus also allows electronic 23commerce to take place without hindrance from statutes of frauds. 1
In light of UETA and ESIGN, Article 2 does not need to be revised to address issues raised by the statute of frauds. Nothing illustrates this point better than NCCUSL's decision to replicate UETA's
provisions in the August 2002 approved amendments to Article 2.124
120 UETA § 7 (1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/nlc/fnact99/
1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
121 UETA defines a record as "information that is inscribed on a tangible medium
or that is stored in an electronic or other medium and is retrievable in perceivable
form." Id. § 2(13). It defines an electronic record as "a record created, generated,
sent, communicated, received, or stored by electronic means." Id. § 2(7).
122 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (a)(1).
123 Although ESIGN is a federal statute, it does not preempt UETA. See Patricia
Brumfield Fry, A Preliminary Analysis of Federal and State Electronic Commerce
Laws, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-articles/uniformacts-article-ueta.
asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) (providing an in-depth analysis of the ESIGN's preemptive effects). On the contrary, ESIGN specifically provides that, if a state has enacted UETA, then UETA rather than ESIGN will govern exceptions to state statutes of
frauds. See 15 U.S.C. § 7002 (a) (1). Although the similarity of the statutes generally
makes it irrelevant which law applies, a number of subtle difference do exist. See Fry,
supra, § 2.B. (discussing these differences).
124 NCCUSL expressed the intent to replicate UETA's provisions in Article 2 in a
prefatory note that accompanied the Annual Meeting 2001 Draft. See Amendments to
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2-Sales, prefatory note (2001), at http://
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc2/ucc06l2.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Annual Meeting 2001 Draft] (indicating that, consistent with UETA and ESIGN,
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Attribution of Electronic Records

A second issue raised by electronic commerce concerns the attribution of electronic records to the persons who made them. Recalling the hypothetical above, suppose that someone visits an office
supply company's website and purchases office supplies in the name
of the law school. The office supply company ships the goods and
then demands payment. The law school refuses to pay, insisting that
the supplier prove that the law school (as opposed to some unknown
interloper) actually placed the order.
How can the supplier attribute the order to the law school? What
proof is legally sufficient? These are new and important questions
raised by electronic commerce. Yet, NCCUSL did not need to revise
Article 2 to address them. Again, legislation outside the U.C.C. already supplies the answers.
UETA addresses the issue of attribution with the following
provision:
[a]n electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a

person if it was the act of the person. The act of the person may be
shown in any manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any
security procedure applied to determine the person to which the
25
electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.
Although no cases have yet applied this provision, the UETA
commentary confirms that an electronic record and electronic signature would be attributable to a person if the "person types his/her
name as part of an e-mail purchase order.

'126

The commentary also

makes clear that the plaintiff would have to overcome any evidence
presented by the defendant of fraud or forgery.' 2 7 Because of this
provision, Article 2 does not need revision to address the question of
1

attribution.

28

all references to "writing" are being changed to "record" and that the terms "record"
and "sign" will be defined to permit electronic records and signatures). The Annual
Meeting 2002 Draft, to which NCCUSL gave its final approval in August 2002, replicates the relevant provisions but does not contain a prefatory note. See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13.
125 UETA § 9(a), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/
ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
126 Id. § 9 cmt. 1.
127 See id.
128 See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-212 (copying almost verbatim UETA § 9).
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3. Authority and Capacity of Electronic Agents
Electronic commerce also raises questions about the authority
and capacity of computers to make contracts. For example, returning
again to the hypothetical above, suppose that a law school employee
visits the supply company's website and makes a purchase. A computer processes the sale for the supply company and sends a confirmation without any human intervention. Could the office supply
company later argue that its computer lacked either authority or capacity to bind it to a contract?
Article 2 does not need revision to answer this question. The
U.C.C. generally has left questions of agency and capacity to nonU.C.C. law.' 29 Here again, state legislatures and the federal government already have stepped in with alternative legislation. UETA and
ESIGN each contain provisions designed to remove any doubt that
electronic agents may form contracts. UETA says, "A contract may be
formed by the interaction of electronic agents of the parties, even if
no individual was aware of or reviewed the electronic agents' actions
or the resulting terms and agreements.' 30 ESIGN contains a similar
provision.

131

These provisions in UETA and ESIGN do not, in fact, purport to
change existing law. Instead, as the UETA commentary asserts, they
merely confirm that machines may act as agents. 132 No cases have yet
129 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (1994).
130 UETA § 14(1), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/
1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002). UETA further states,
(2) A contract may be formed by the interaction of an electronic agent and
an individual, acting on the individual's own behalf or for another person,
including by an interaction in which the individual performs actions that the
individual is free to refuse to perform and which the individual knows or has
reason to know will cause the electronic agent to complete the transaction
or performance. (3) The terms of the contract are determined by the substantive law applicable to it.
Id. §§ 14(2)-(3).
131 15 U.S.C. § 7001(h) (2000). The Code provides,
A contract or other record relating to a transaction in or affecting interstate
or foreign commerce may not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because its formation, creation, or delivery involved the action of
one or more electronic agents so long as the action of any such electronic
agent is legally attributable to the person to be bound.
Id.
132 See UETA § 14 cmt. 1, availableat http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/filact99/
1990s/ueta99.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2002).
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addressed these sections, but they appear to dispel most questions that
might arise. Any amendment to Article 2 would be redundant. I3 3
In sum, the growth of electronic commerce over the past decade
has not increased the need to amend Article 2. On the contrary, it
may have decreased the need. Many of Article 2's current provisions
address traditional methods of making contracts, and the growth of
electronic commerce makes these provisions less relevant now than
they were in 1991. Accordingly, any problems they may contain have
become less significant. Although electronic commerce raises new
and important issues, Article 2 does not need to address them because
other legislation already performs that function.
III.

THE DECISION

To

TREAT COMPUTER SOFIrWARE SEPARATELY

Almost no private sales of computer software were taking place
when NCCUSL and the ALI approved the first version of Article 2 in
the 1950s. 134 During the past fifty years, however, sales of computer
software have become very important. Business and consumers
purchase well over $50 billion in software annually, and the total volume continues to grow. 1 35 When disputes have arisen, courts sometimes have had to consider whether to apply Article 2's rules to
136
software sales.
Computer software does not fit comfortably within Article 2 for
two reasons. First, Article 2 applies to contracts for the sale of
goods, 137 and the definition of "goods" applies problematically to
software.' 38 Article 2 says that goods include "things which are mova133 See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-204(4) (copying almost verbatim UETA § 14).
134 See Graeme Browning, Software Hardball, 24 NAT'L J. 2062, 2062 (1992) (explaining how software was bundled with the first simple computers sold in the 1950s).
135 See Elizabeth MacDonald, CPA Group's Plan Would Standardize the Accounting for
Software Expenses, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 1996, at B2 (reporting estimate that off-theshelf software purchases, which stood at $47.9 million, will grow to $79 billion in
2000).
136 See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
that Article 2 does apply to software); Sys. Design and Mgmt. Info., Inc. v. Kan. City
Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878, 882 (Kan. Ct. App. 1990) (holding
that software is a good and is subject to the U.C.C.); USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little
Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888, 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that contract dealing
with turnkey computer system was subject to Article 2).
137 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2002) ("Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article
applies to transactions in goods ....
).
138 Scholars have long struggled with issues raised by the application of Article 2 to
computer software. For some early and influential thoughts, see David A. Owen, The
Application of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Computer Contracts, 14 N. Ky. L.
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ble."'
This definition clearly includes tangible items, like books,
even if they contain copyrighted material. 140 The definition, however,
generally excludes intangibles-like legal rights or services-because
41
they lack physical properties that would make them movable.
Sometimes vendors subsume computer software into a physical
object before selling it. 142 For example, a business might record a
program onto a disk, and then sell the disk. Although the program
itself may lack tangible physical properties, the disk has them, and the
disk therefore clearly is a "thing which is movable." In this situation,
courts have not had difficulty deciding to apply Article 2.143
Yet, not all sales of computer software involve the transfer of physical objects. For example, when a person buys a program by
downloading it from the Internet, the seller does not provide anything tangible to the buyer. Although the buyer may store the program on one of the buyer's own disks, no title to the disk or to any
other tangible item passes from the seller to the buyer. 144 In this situ45
ation, deciding to apply Article 2 becomes much more difficult.1
REv. 277 (1987) (describing the various approaches courts use to determine whether
a transaction in the computer industry is one for goods or services); Andrew Rodau,
Computer Software: Does Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code Apply, 35 EMORY L.J. 853
(1988) (arguing that judicial interpretation and the tangible and intangible property
aspects of software show that it is a good); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the
U.C.C., 77 Mict-,. L. REV. 1149 (1979) (concluding that contracts for computer program copies are typically within the scope of the U.C.C.).
139 U.C.C. § 2-105(1) ("'Goods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for
sale .... ).
140 See Cardozo v. True, 342 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (definition of goods under U.C.C. includes books).
141 See 1 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 81, § 2-105:2 ("The exclusion of 'things in
action' and the inclusion of 'things which are movable' suggests that Section 2-105
limits goods to tangible personal property.").
142 See, e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 675 (3d Cir. 1991).
143 See id. The court explained,
An analogy can be drawn to a compact disc recording of an orchestral rendition. The music is produced by the artistry of musicians and in itself is not a
"good," but when transferred to a laser-readable disc becomes a readily merchantable commodity. Similarly, when a professor delivers a lecture, it is not
a good, but, when transcribed as a book, it becomes a good.
Id. at 675.
144 See U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (defining a sale to consist of the "the passing of title from
the seller to the buyer for a price").
145 See Lorin Brennan, Why Article 2 Cannot Apply To Software Transactions, 38 DuQ.
L. REV. 459, 465 (2001) (presenting this difficulty as one reason for concluding that
Article 2 does not apply to software).
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Second, even if software falls within the definition of goods, many
software sales occur in "hybrid" transactions. A hybrid transaction involves both the sale of goods plus the undertaking of other contractual obligations.146 For example, a contractor might agree to sell and
install a new window. The sale of the window is a sale of goods, but
the promise to perform the service of installation is not. 14 7 Hybrid
transactions long have complicated application of Article 2 because its
scope provision does not address them.1 48 Sales of computer software
often are hybrids because they typically go beyond merely conveying
title to goods from the buyer to the seller for a price. 49 Instead, the
seller and buyer often agree on some set of terms and conditions for
the use of the software.
The terms and conditions on the use of software can take two
forms. In some instances, these terms give the buyer rights that the
buyer would not acquire merely by purchasing the software. For example, if the terms include a "site license," the buyer may copy the
software for use throughout seller's office. 150 In the absence of this
license, federal copyright laws might prevent the copying. 1-1
In other instances, the terms included with the sale of the
software may limit the buyer's rights. 152 For example, the terms may
say that the buyer cannot use the software for commercial purposes or

146 See Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Bros., 398 N.W.2d 553, 555-56 (Minn.
1987) (explaining hybrid transaction in depth).
147 See, e.g., Coakley & Williams, Inc. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 778 F.2d 196, 198
(4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1121 (1986).
148 See U.C.C. § 2-102.
149 See generally Andrew G. Rodau, The Extension of UCC's Article 2 to "Hybrid"
Software Transactions, NAT'L LJ., June 22, 1987, at 23 (discussing the confusion over
whether computer software is a "good" under Article 2).
150 See Lothar Determann & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Don'tJudge a Sale by Its License:
Software Transfers Under the First Sale Doctrine in the United States and the European Community, 36 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 101-02 (2001) (describing site licenses).
151 See, e.g., Geoscan, Inc. v. Geotrace Techs., Inc., 226 F.3d 387, 392 (5th Cir.
2000) (analyzing plaintiff's claim that business violated copyright by copying software
for numerous computers without proper site license).
152 One important point of terminology is that, for some reason, the software industry refers to all terms regarding the use of software as "licenses," whether they
increase or decrease the rights the buyer ordinarily would have under applicable copyright and other laws. This usage is both novel and somewhat confusing. Traditionally, when a copyright holder grants a license, the copyright holder gives the licensee
additional rights. But in the sale of software, even restrictions on what the buyer
could otherwise do with the software are called licenses.

NOTRE

DAME

[VOL- 78:2

LAW REVIEW

cannot resell the software to certain types of users.153 Sometimes
these terms even attempt to restrict what subsequent third-party purchasers of the software can do with it. Absent these terms, nothing in
the federal copyright law would prevent the buyer from selling the
154
software.
The hybrid nature of computer software sales poses a couple of
serious problems for Article 2. If the terms and conditions
predominate over other aspects of the contract, then most courts
would say that Article 2 should not govern the transaction at all.' 55 In
addition, even if Article 2 does apply to the transaction, nothing in
Article 2 says anything about contractual terms regarding the use of
computer software. Its application, accordingly, has ambiguous consequences at best.
For these reasons, devising rules for computer software sales was a
high priority when NCCUSL's initial drafting committee began work
on Article 2. As explained above, the committee tentatively embarked
on a complicated scheme to put this recommendation into effect; they
were going to treat the sales portion of the transaction in Article 2,
156
and terms regarding the use of software in an integrated Article 2B.
Eventually, however, NCCUSL abandoned this plan, promulgating
57
UCITA instead of amending the U.C.C.1

UCITA has not resolved the question of how the law should treat
terms regarding the use of computer software. At this time, only two
states-Virginia and Maryland-have adopted UCITA.15

1

Although

153 See, e.g., Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc. 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1093
(N.D. Cal. 2000) (recognizing that the license restricted resale of software only to
educational users).
154 Federal copyright law contains a "first sale" doctrine. Under this doctrine, "a
sale of a 'lawfully made' copy terminates a copyright holder's authority to interfere
with subsequent sales or distribution of that particular copy." Parfums Givenchy, Inc.
v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the purchaser
of a copyrighted item-like a book, music CD, or computer program-can resell the
book without violating the copyright law. The extent to which the copyright holder
may restrict the resale by contract (as opposed to copyright law) remains subject to
doubt.
155 Most courts will apply the U.C.C. to a hybrid transaction when the sale of
goods predominates over aspects of the transaction. See, e.g., Bonebrake v. Cox, 499
F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 1974); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 n.8
(Mass. 1980).
156 See supra Part II.
157 See supra Part II.
158 See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Introductions & Adoptions of Uniform Acts, at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/
uniformacts-fs-ucita.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2002); see also No Votes Taken on Amendments to UCITA; Decisions To Be Made During Conference Call, 70 U.S.L.W. 2339 (Dec. 4,
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NCCUSL is working on revising the Act to give it broader appeal,1 59
the question of whether or how Article 2 might govern persists in the
rest of the states. Moreover, UCITA leaves unsettled important questions about the scope of Article 2 in hybrid transactions. For example,
suppose that a person buys a DVD player that contains a computer
chip loaded with software. Doubt remains about the extent to which
Article 2 and UCITA would govern the transaction. 60
Yet, even if UCITA has not solved the problem of computer
software, the decision to address computer software outside of Article
2 has reduced the need to revise Article 2. Put another way, a decade
ago, the drafters believed that they had to amend Article 2 to address
issues raised by the sale of computer software. That is no longer true
because of the decision to deal with these problems in a separate way.
Accordingly, one of the main reasons for revising Article 2 has
disappeared.
W.

A

DECADE OF PRECEDENT

More than a decade has passed since NCCUSL made its decision
to revise Article 2 in 1991.161 During this time, numerous precedents
interpreting Article 2 have accumulated. These precedents have addressed and clarified a large number of ambiguities in Article 2's provisions. Although they have not eliminated all conflicts among
jurisdictions, they have improved the situation a great deal. The need
to revise Article 2 to address problems in its drafting accordingly has
diminished over this time.
A.

Examples of Clarification

As explained above, NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2 largely
on the basis of a report prepared by a PEB Study Group.1 62 A significant portion of this report focused on problems with Article 2's draft2001) (summarizing some of the reasons that many consider UCITA to be too
controversial).
159 See Report of UCITA Standby Committee, at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
ulc/ucita/UCITADec01_Proposal.htm (Dec. 17, 2001).
160 Under one recently proposed compromise, "Article 2 would apply to goods
that included software as a part of their operation, but would not govern the software
itself." NCCUSL Plans To PresentDraft Without FinalApproval to ALl Council in December,
70 U.S.L.W. 2193 (Oct. 2, 2001). The amendments to Article 2 approved in August of
2002 do not purport to change the scope of Article 2 other than expressly excluding
"information" from the definition of goods. See Annual Meeting Draft 2002, supra
note 13, § 2-103(k) (1).
161 See supra Part I.B.
162 See supra Part I.B.
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ing. 163 The PEB Study Group identified a number of sections that
1 64
were causing confusion in the courts.
Even without amendments to Article 2, judicial decisions during
the past decade have ameliorated many of the problems identified by
the PEB Study Group. A few examples illustrate this point. One of
the first recommendations in the PEB Study Group's report concerned section 2-601,165 which states the so-called "perfect tender
rule."' 66 Under section 2-601, a buyer may reject tendered goods if
they "fail in any respect to conform to the contract. 1 6 7 The buyer
then may assert against the seller the full panoply of remedies made
168
available by Article 2 for breach of contract.
Section 2-601, at first glance, may appear to state a rather extreme rule. Its text would seem to allow a buyer to reject goods even if
they deviate from the contract in the most minor ways. The drafters
of the U.C.C., however, did not intend to give buyers unlimited power
to reject goods because of defects. On the contrary, in section 1-203,
they specified that every contract within the scope of the entire U.C.C.
contains an implied "obligation of good faith in its performance and
enforcement. ' 169 Accordingly, when exercising the right to reject
goods under section 2-601, a buyer must act in good faith even though
section 2-601 does not itself expressly state a requirement of good
faith. 171 If a buyer is a merchant, the requirement of good faith
means that the buyer must act honestly and must observe "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."1 7 1 These standards of fair dealing may preclude rejections based on trivial defects.
The PEB Study Group worried that the general implied obligation of good faith in section 1-203 might go overlooked. 72 In other
words, buyers might act in bad faith, and courts might not see the
problem. Accordingly, the PEB Study Group suggested amending section 2-601 to make clear that a buyer had to act in good faith when
163 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1872-75.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 1872-73.
166 U.C.C. § 2-601 (2002) ("[I]f the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may (a) reject the whole; or (b) accept
the whole; or (c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.").
167 Id.
168 See id. § 2-711 (listing these remedies).
169 Id. § 1-203 ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
170 See 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-601:3
(2002) (describing good faith limitations on § 2-601).
171 U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b).
172 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1877.
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deciding whether to reject goods. 173 Although the PEB Study Group's
report did not specify how to make the change, an amendment simply
could insert words directly into section 2-601 saying that rejection may
occur "subject to the requirement good faith." Although this amendment would not change the law (given section 1-203's present general
duty of good faith), it would bring clarity to the law.
In the past decade, potential confusion over section 2-601 has diminished because precedent has clarified that the requirement of
good faith limits the buyer's ability to reject. Indeed, a number of
courts have applied section 2-601, and all of their opinions correctly
recognize the duty of good faith imposed by section 1-203.174 Accordingly, even if some misunderstanding of the issue persists, the need to
amend section section 2-601 has waned. Indeed, the drafting committee in its most recent draft apparently did not see a continuing need
75
to alter section 2-601 to specify a requirement of good faith.
A second example concerns the statute of frauds in section 2201.176 Section 2-201, as discussed at length above, generally makes
promises to buy or sell goods for a price of $500 or more unenforceable "unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made." 177 One longstanding issue under section 2201 is whether a party who has detrimentally relied on a promise may
overcome the requirement of writing under a theory of promissory
estoppel. 178 The PEB Study Group suggested in its report that a revision of Article 2 should address the issue of reliance under section 2201.179

Two competing considerations complicate this issue. On one
hand, many courts have allowed parties to overcome other statutes of
173 See id. at 1873 ("At a minimum, § 2-601 should be revised to state that rejection
is limited by the duty of good faith.").
174 See, e.g., Bellsouth Telesensor v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., No. CA-90-1553-S,
1995 WL 520978, at *8 (4th Cir. Sept. 5, 1995); Subaru Distrib. Corp. v. Subaru of
America, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 5566 (CM), 2002 WL 413808, at *8, *37 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18,
2002); In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 156 B.R. 922, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 845 P.2d 567, 577 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992); Y & N Furniture, Inc. v.
Nwabuoku 734 N.Y.S.2d 382, 385 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2001); Domanik Sales Co., Inc. v.
Paulaner-North America Corp., No. 00-0669, 2000 WL 1855144, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 20, 2000).
175 See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-601.
176 See U.C.C. § 2-201.
177 Id. § 2-201(1).
178 See 1 HAWKLAND ET AL., supra note 81, § 2-201:8 (discussing whether promissory
or equitable estoppel may provide an exception).
179 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1874.
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frauds using promissory estoppel. 80 On the other hand, section 2201 lists several exceptions to its writing requirement, but does not say
anything about reliance.""' This omission may suggest that the draft18 2
ers of Article 2 specifically rejected the promissory estoppel theory.
At the time the Study Group made its recommendation that a
revision should address reliance, 8" great uncertainty surrounded this
issue. Some courts were willing to enforce promises based on reliance, others were not, and still other courts had not reached the issue.'8 4 The problem, for this reason, called for legislative attention.
During the past ten years, the rift among jurisdictions has not

disappeared. Yet, uncertainty about the issue largely has diminished.
Through numerous decisions, previously undecided states have
reached one conclusion or another.1 8 5 Although the problem of nonuniformity among jurisdictions remains, the need to amend the statute to bring about clarity has waned. The amendments NCCUSL approved in August 2002, perhaps for this reason, do not address
reliance. 186
A third example concerns the infamous section 2-207,187 a provision that alters the common law's "mirror-image rule." The mirrorimage rule says that a purported acceptance of an offer that has different or additional terms is not an acceptance but is in reality a counter180 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 139(1) (1981) ("A promise which
the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of
the promisee or a third person and which does induce the action or forbearance is
enforceable notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise."); Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REX.
508, 523-25 (1998)
(discussing acceptance of section 139 among different
jurisdictions).
181 See I HAWK[AND ET AL., supra note 81, § 2-201:8 ("Given the liberalizing force
of the rules of Section 2-201 (2) and (3), it is somewhat difficult to imagine situations
where additional relief should be given by way of estoppel." (footnote omitted)).
182 See, e.g., Lige Dickson Co. v. Union Oil Co., 635 P.2d 103, 103, 107 (Wash.
1981) (rejecting promissory estoppel in a case involving section 2-201 of the U.C.C.).
183 See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
184 See Allied Grape Growers v. Bronco Wine Co., 249 Cal. Rptr. 872, 878 (Ct. App.
1988) (listing cases conflicting on the issue and noting that the majority recognize
reliance as an exception).
185 See Christopher M. Bellomy, Estoppel and Section 2-201 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 100 COM. L.J. 536 (1995) (identifying different approaches).
186 See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-201.
187 U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (2002) ("A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or
agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.").
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offer. 188 Section 2-207(1) strives to create a major exception to this
rule for contracts concerning the sale of goods. The section says that
a purported acceptance is an acceptance even if it states additional or
different terms, "unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on
assent to the additional or different terms." 18 9
Courts have had difficulty applying section 2-207 because it contains a number of ambiguities. For example, at the time that the PEB
Study Group wrote its report, jurisdictions disagreed about what the
offeree must say to make acceptance "expressly conditional" under
section 2-207(1). In the leading case of Dorton v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 19° one court held that the conditional nature of the acceptance
must be so clearly expressed that the offeror has notice that the offeree is unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless the additional
or different terms are included in the contract. In contrast, in the
famous decision of Roto-Lith Ltd. v. F.P.Bartlett & Co., Inc., 19 1 another
court held that merely including a term materially altering the offer
amounts to a conditional acceptance. The PEB Study Group believed
that section 2-207(1) required revision to address this kind of
92
problem. 1
Two important developments have occurred in the past ten years
in relation to this particular issue. First, over a dozen cases have considered the question, and they all have accepted the Dorton view and
rejected the Roto-Lith approach. 193 Many of these decisions expressly
describe the split between Roto-Lith and Dorton, indicating that the
courts thought carefully about the question. 194 Second, the First Circuit has decided to overrule its decision in Roto-Lith.1 9 5 Accordingly,
188

See

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 59 (1981) ("A reply to an offer

which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer.").

189 U.C.C. § 2-207(1).
190 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
191 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
192 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1874 (noting that "application of § 2207 has generated confusion in the courts, excessive litigation, and continuing criticism from the commentators").
193 See, e.g., Frank M. Booth, Inc. v. Reynolds Metals Co., 754 F. Supp. 1441, 1447
(E.D. Cal. 1991); Polyclad Laminates, Inc. v. VITS Maschinenbau GmbH, 749 F. Supp.
342, 344 (D.N.H. 1990); St. Charles Cable TV, Inc. v. Eagle Comtronics, Inc., 687 F.
Supp. 820, 828 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
194 See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000);
Gardner Zemke Co. v. Dunham Bush, Inc., 850 P.2d 319, 323-24 (N.M. 1993); Stanley-Bostitch, Inc. v. Regenerative Envtl. Equip. Co., Inc., 697 A.2d 323, 327-28 (R.I.
1997).
195

See Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors, Inc., 110 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997).
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the need to revise Article 2 to address this problem largely has disappeared. The amendments NCCUSL approved in August 2002 modify
section 2-207, but would preserve this result. 196
B. Limitations of Precedent
The foregoing discussion has shown how precedent has ameliorated some of the problems identified by the PEB Study Group when
it recommended revising Article 2. Judicial decisions have addressed
notjust these three problems, but many, many other issues under Article 2. Yet, precedents do have at least three important limitations that
deserve mention.
First, precedents over the past ten years have not clarified all issues under Article 2. For example, another battle of the forms issue is
whether different terms in a proposed offer become part of the contract created by section 2-207(1). Article 2 provides no express answer. 19 7 At the time NCCUSL decided to revise Article 2, courts had
expressed three different views on the subject.198 Since then, however, only a few cases squarely have confronted the question.' 9 9 The
20 0
topic, like many others, remains subject to doubt.
Second, amending the statute would insure uniformity among
the states in a way that judicial precedents cannot reasonably be expected to do. For instance, even if a dozen new cases address the
effect of reliance on the statute of frauds in section 2-201(1), these
196 The draft, which moves section 2-207(1) to section 2-206(3), would eliminate
the "unless" clause. See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft, supra note 13, § 2-206(4). The
drafters evidently believe that an acceptance that falls within the high standard im-

posed by the Dorton case would not amount to a purported acceptance. See Annual
Meeting 2001 Draft, supra note 124, § 2-206 prelim. cmt. 2. The comment states,

The "unless" clause that appeared at the end of the sentence that is now
subsection (3) when that sentence was a part of original Section 2-207(1) has

been omitted as unnecessary. Subsection (3) rejects the mirror image rule,
but any responsive record must still be fairly regarded as an "acceptance"
and not as a proposal for such a different transaction that it should be construed to be a rejection of the offer.

Id.
197 Section 2-207(2) addresses additional terms, but not different terms. See
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (2002) ("The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract.").
198 See Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1579-80 (10th Cir. 1984)
(discussing three different approaches to this issue).
199 See, e.g., Superior Boiler Works, Inc. v. R.J. Sanders, Inc., 711 A.2d 628, 635
(R.I. 1998) (discussing the battle of the forms approaches taken by various courts and
adopting the "knock-out rule" as Rhode Island's approach).
200 The latest draft would resolve this ambiguity. See Annual Meeting 2002 Draft,
supra note 13, § 2-207.

2003]

WANING

IMPORTANCE

OF REVISIONS

TO

U.C.C.

ARTICLE

2

627

cases might not all reach the same conclusions on every point. The
law, moreover, would remain unsettled in jurisdictions that have not
addressed the issue.
Third, although judicial precedents can clarify ambiguities, they
cannot make necessary substantive changes to the law. For example,
throughout the revision process, the two drafting committees have
sought to raise the threshold price for the statute of frauds from $500
to $5000 to reflect inflation since the 1950s. 20 1 Courts have not felt
free to make this type of change. The PEB Study Group wanted the
drafting committee to make numerous revisions of this kind.20 2 These
three limitations suggest that some need for amendment still may remain, but do not negate the observation that the need to revise Article
2 has diminished.
CONCLUSION

This Article has not attempted to argue that NCCUSL erred in
deciding to revise U.C.C. Article 2 in 1991. The statute plainly had a
number of problems. Skillful drafting and substantive changes clearly
could have improved the law in some places.
The Article also has not attempted to criticize the choices that the
drafting committees have made during the decade-long revision process. The committees have come up with many good ideas. Even if
some did not make it into the draft revision approved in August 2002,
the law has benefitted from their work.
Furthermore, this Article has not claimed that Article 2 no longer
needs revision. On the contrary, as indicated in several places, numerous problems still remain. For example, precedents have addressed
only some of the issues that concerned the drafters a decade ago.
Moreover, the treatment of computer software remains a difficult
subject.

This Article, however, has sought to demonstrate that, for a variety of reasons, the need to revise Article 2 has diminished over the
past decade. This observation should provide some comfort to both
those who supported revision and those who opposed it. Supporters
of revision can take solace in knowing that their inability to achieve
comprehensive modernization ultimately may not have had serious
consequences. Opponents of revision may see this diminishing need
as a further argument for their view.
201 See id. § 2-201(1) (proposing the change for inflation).
202 See PEB Study Group, supra note 43, at 1872-75 (recommending numerous
substantive changes).
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This demonstration that the urgency of revising Article 2 has
waned also may have implications when state legislatures decide
whether to enact the amendments that NCCUSL finally has approved.
These amendments are not very controversial. Yet, as this Article has
shown, they also are not tremendously urgent.

